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BRAZILIAN GAS MARKET 
AND ITS REGULATORY OVERVIEW 
HIRDAN KATARINA DE MEDEIROS COSTA, KARINA NINNI RAMOS, ISRAEL 
LACERDA DE ARAUJO, PAOLA MERCADANTE PETRY, OWEN ANDERSON & 
EDMILSON MOUTINHO DOS SANTOS 
Abstract   
This article offers a brief analysis for better understanding the current 
Brazilian regulatory framework regarding the distribution of natural gas 
(NG), especially considering the innovations introduced by the Gas Law 
(11.909/2009) and the current debate concerning the New Market Program. 
The methodology consisted of a literature review and survey of various data 
to analyze the Brazilian gas sector from the perspective of political risk and 
the New Institutional Economics (NIE) analysis. By using this 
methodology, it is clear that the current regulatory framework creates a 
disparity of scenarios throughout the Brazilian territory. In essence, that 
legal uncertainty prevents greater investment in the gas sector.   
Keywords: natural gas industry; regulatory framework; Brazilian 
Congress; Law Gas. 
1. Introduction  
NG contributed a small share to the Brazilian energy matrix in 1990. 
However, this scenario changed a bit in the late 1990s through increasing 
imports of gas through the Bolivia Brazil Gas Pipeline (GASBOL) 
Project—an intergovernmental initiative. This pipeline may be considered a 
milestone in the Brazilian NG infrastructure because it provided firmer and 
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conditions for gas supply and enabled the consequent expansion of the gas 
market (Moutinho dos Santos et al., 2002).  
A second investment wave in Brazilian NG trade history started with the 
Natural Gas Massification Plan, launched in late 2003. This plan, along 
with the freezing of NG prices, enabled NG to better compete with 
substitutes and resulted in increased consumption of gas. Since then, NG 
has been more frequent in the Brazilian energy sector (Sonja, 2014). It 
increased Brazil’s energy security, ensured the diversification of the 
Brazilian energy matrix, reduced pollution, and reduced GHG emissions 
compared to the burning of oil and coal (Moutinho dos Santos et al., 2002; 
Brito et al., 2017).   
Moreover, Brazil is expecting an increased supply of NG in the coming 
decade. In addition, the country is expected to see a 77% increase after 
2025, due to associated gas production from giant reservoirs in the Pre-Salt 
oil province (Fiorenze et al., 2013; EPE, 2020). Clearly, NG has enormous 
potential. However, Brazil has been facing challenges that hinder the full 
development of this resource. The greatest issue is a lack of infrastructure 
and regulatory harmonization in approaches by the federal Union and the 
Brazilian States, which leads to legal insecurity and political risk. This 
paper focuses on those regulatory challenges. Section 2 discusses Brazilian 
NG rules. Section 3 presents our theory approach based on New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) analysis, and how institutional changes 
work. Section 4 offers our analysis of the New Gas Market Policy and how 
its institutional change is trying to improve the Brazilian regulatory 
framework. Finally, we present some conclusions related to the potential 
that those changes may increase the efficiency and to reduce the price of 
NG in Brazil. 
2. Brazilian Natural Gas legal scene  
The Oil Law (Law No. 9.478/1997) and Gas Law (11.909/2009) are the 
main federal laws currently addressing NG in Brazil. The Oil Law 
addresses the upstream issues and regulates NG production activities by the 
oil industry. Before the Gas Law, the Oil Law provided interested parties 
access to transport pipelines and terminals. In addition, the regulatory 
agency, the National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels 
(ANP), was responsible for authorizing both deployment and operation of 
NG transport facilities (Araújo et al., 2018).  
Although the Oil Law covers several points regarding the NG chain, it 
has proved to be insufficient to effectively regulate the entire NG industry 
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(Costa, Tome and Silva, 2019). The Oil Law failed to promote the entry of 
new and private companies in the transport sector (Costa et al., 2018). 
Reduction in NG private investments and conflicts among Brazilian State-
Owned Enterprise (SOE), Petrobras, and private investors over access to the 
Bolivia-Brazil gas-pipeline exemplified the lack of effective regulatory 
mechanisms (Costa, Araújo and Mascarenhas, 2019). This situation 
increased risk and discouraged new investments in the transport sector 
(Colomer Ferraro and Hallack, 2012).  
The Gas Law introduced the concepts of self-producers (NG producer 
and explorer agents who use all or part of their own production as raw 
material or fuel in their industrial facilities), self-importers (agents 
authorized to import NG for use of all or part of the imported gas as raw 
material or fuel in their industrial facilities), and free consumers (agents 
who have the option to purchase NG from any production, import, or trade 
agent) (Negreiros, 2013). In addition, the 2009 Gas Law empowered ANP 
to authorize and facilitate NG trading activity in the federal sphere by 
registering NG supply contracts, NG self-producers, and self-importers 
(Araújo et al., 2018).   
Nevertheless, the cross-participation of Petrobras in all sectors prevented 
the entrance of other potential investors in the transport sector. Thus, 
factors such as market design provided a barrier to competition (Colomer 
Ferraro; Hallack, 2012). The new reforms are intended to end the Petrobras 
monopoly. These reforms followed the structure adopted in the USA to 
deregulate the gas sector through Order 636, issued in 1992 by the U.S. 
Federal Energy and Regulatory Commission (FERC) (Costa and Araújo, 
2018). This order required interstate pipeline companies to unbundle their 
gas purchases and sales from the transport service, and to open access to the 
gas transport and storage infrastructure. It helped encourage the 
development of market centers at the various interconnections of the 
interstate pipeline system (Sant Ana et al., 2009).   
2.1. Before the institutional change in 1995: historical review 
During the colonial period (1500-1822), the Brazilian subsoil ownership 
belonged to the Portuguese crown (Regalian system). After Brazilian 
gained its independence in 1822, the Brazilian Empire became the owner of 
the underground mineral resources (Domanial system). In 1889, with the 
Republic Proclamation, mineral ownership belonged to Republic of the 
United States of Brazil
1
. From 1891 to 1934, under the influence of the 
                                                                                                             
 1. In 1967 the name of the country was changed to Federative Republic of Brazil.  
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In the early 1930s, petroleum started to be seen as a strategic asset, 
which coincided with the growth of Brazilian nationalism. Consequently, 
the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1934 guaranteed mineral ownership in 
the Brazilian Federal Union. However, a private party could secure a right 
to explore for and extract petroleum by obtaining a private license.  
At the beginning of the Getulio Vargas’ dictatorship, the Brazilian 
Federal Constitution of 1937 closed the oil market to foreign capital. In 
1938, the Petroleum National Council regulated the petroleum sector, and 
allowed for geophysical exploration and to engage in oil exploitation. In the 
mid-1940’s, the Vargas government carried out a populist and nationalist 
campaign that included the slogan, "the petroleum is ours".    
In 1953, Law 2004 was enacted, creating the SOE Petróleo Brasileiro 
S.A.—Petrobras, Brazil’s national oil company. This Law established a 
federal monopoly over all aspects of the petroleum industry (except for the 
export, import, and distribution of fuels)
3




During that period, Petrobras had many different functions. Before the 
first oil shock, its basic role was to be a gasoline supplier (wholesale 
distribution and retail via service stations) (Petrobras, 2019) because there 
were no large oil discoveries in Brazil. In 1961, Walter K. Link, an 
American geologist, was contracted by Petrobras to perform geophysical 
(seismic) exploration. He determined that, given the available technology, 
no commercial oil or NG deposits were present in Brazil’s NG Paleozoic 
lands basins.
4
 (Petrobras, 2019).  
During the 1970s oil shocks, importer countries realized the dangers of 
dependence on oil from exporter countries. In this context, many countries 
faced new challenges in applying energy conservation programs and sought 
alternative sources of oil, including new frontiers for petroleum exploration 
in the North Sea, Alaska, deep offshore, and in developing countries. 
Common denominators of these new frontiers were higher exploration, 
development, and production costs (Petrobras, 2019). 
                                                                                                             
 2. Article 72, § 17: "The mines belong to the owners of the land, subject to the 
limitations that are established in the law and the holding of this branch of industry." 
 3. In 1963 the monopoly was extended, covering also activities import and export oil 
and derivatives. 
 4. Marajó, Acre, Baixo Amazonas, Médio Amazonas, Paraná, and Parnaíba 
Sedimentary Basins. 
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In 1984, Petrobras made its first discovery of oil reserves (more than one 
billion barrels) in the Albacora oilfield in the Campos basin, Rio de Janeiro 
(Petrobras, 2019). Since then, additional discoveries of major reserves have 
been made in Brazilian waters (Petrobras, 2019).   
By the end of the 1970’s, Brazil adopted a “risk-service” form of host-
government contract to improve performance in the petroleum exploration 
and production sectors (Silva and Costa, 2019). The form of contract was 
intended to attract foreign and private investments for Greenfield areas, 
which aimed to find more oil reserves in order to help the country to reduce 
oil import dependence and its negative effects on the Brazilian macro-
economy.  
However, no relevant oil field was discovered in areas under the risk-
service contract regime and many investors did not find the risk-service 
contract form to be attractive. In 1988, the Federal Constitution banned 
risk-service contracts and the original text of Article 177 prohibited any 
assignment or grant in the exploration, production, refining, importation, 
exportation, or transportation of crude oil and NG. The that Federal 
Government declared itself the sole owner of all oil and NG deposits 
existing in the Brazilian national territory, including the inland, the 
territorial sea, the continental shelf, and the exclusive economic zone 
(Article 20, item IX of The Federal Constitution). 
2.2. The institutional change in 1995 
Like many Latin American countries, Brazil has a shifting history of 
greater or lesser oil nationalization. Law 2.004/1953 represented a victory 
for nationalist politicians by establishing a federal oil monopoly through 
Petrobas, under the guidance of a National Oil Council. After two decades, 
President Ernesto Geisel announced a small opening for the private oil 
sector, with risk-service contracts, which, in part, sought to reduce the 
federal budget that financially supported Petrobras (Belchior, 1988). 
During the 1980s, often called the “lost decade” from an economic 
perspective, a strong nationalist movement within the Brazilian Congress 
resulted in a cautionary approach by private investors, including those that 
held petroleum risk-service contracts. The Brazilian Congress enacted the 
current Federal Constitution in 1988, which reestablished the federal oil 
monopoly and forbade new risk-service contracts. However, the 
Constitution created a mechanism to assure legal certainty for existing 
agreements between Petrobras and the private sector. Once again, the 
nationalists prevailed over liberals.    
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In 1995, the Brazilian Congress enacted the Constitutional Amendment 
no. 09, which preserved the federal petroleum monopoly but ended the 
Petrobras monopoly by allowing private investment in the petroleum 
sector
5
. Two years later the Brazilian Congress passed the Petroleum Law 
no. 9478 that “deals with the national energy policy, activities related to the 
oil and gas monopoly, creates the National Council for the Energy Policy 
(CNPE) and the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) and makes other 
provisions” (Law 97/9478). 
With regard to petroleum reservoirs, Article 3 of the Petroleum Law 
provides that the Federal Government owns the petroleum, NG, and other 
fluid hydrocarbon accumulations existing in the national territory, which 
includes the onshore area, the territorial waters, the continental shelf, and 
the exclusive economic zone. Moreover, Article 26 of the Petroleum Law 
provides for petroleum concessions whereby the private concessionaire 
assumes all risk and expense of exploration, development, and production. 
In essence, if exploration methods are successful, then the concessionaire is 
entitled to the petroleum it produces from the concession area (block), 
subject to production royalties, income taxes, and for large discoveries a 
special participation levy—a form of special petroleum tax.  
 Since 1995, these institutional changes have been important to the 
development of the Brazilian oil industry. First, Brazil showed that it could 
create a transparent environment under the rule of law, including an 
independent regulatory agency (ANP), so that investors could feel 
comfortable doing business in the petroleum sector. According to Article 8 
of the Petroleum Law, the purposes of ANP are to promote regulatory 
measures and investment contracts and to monitor economic activities 
inherent to petroleum and NG, including the concession agreements and the 
holding of bid rounds
6
. The Petroleum Law provisions were intended to 
attract investments, which the Brazilian government needed to prove its 
capacity for planning and building a stable investment environment. 
  
                                                                                                             
 5. According to this Law - Article 5 - authorizes regulation of and contracting with 
private companies organized and headquartered in Brazil. 
 6. Since the new oil industry framework, in 1997, until 2017, oil proved reserves 
increase from 7,1 to 12,8 billions of barrels, while natural gas proved reserves decrease from 
410 to 365 billion of m³. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss3/6
2021]      Brazilian Gas Market and Its Regulatory Overview 425 
 
 
Second, although Petrobras continues being dominant in the Brazilian 
upstream, legal changes have encouraged companies to share expertise and 
experience with Petrobras, through contractual joint-venture mechanisms. 
Both institutional changes have contributed to increasing investments in the 
Brazilian oil industry. 
The Brazilian Congress has endeavored to reform the NG distribution 
sector. Before 1988, NG distribution was not foreseen in the Brazil 
Constitution. The Brazilian Congress incorporated NG service under State 
power, but with a nationalism footprint, whereby each State was allowed to 
engage in economic activities for NG distribution through public utilities. 
In 1995, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso submited Constitution 
Amendment no. 05 for congressional discussion, which prohibited the use 
of legislative instruments by the State Executive Power to regulate NG 
services.  
Ore-2009, the law still established a complex NG regulatory scheme. All 
NG activities were regulated by the Union, except NG distribution, which 
was regulated by each State. This structure resulted in a lack of regulatory 
harmony for the NG industry. 
2.3 Law 11.909/09 – The Gas Law  
The 2009 Gas Law addressed deficiencies under the prior law 
concerning NG transport as well as NG treatment, processing, storage, 
liquefaction, regasification, and commercialization. It addressed all of these 
issues within the federalism limitations of Article 177 of the Federal 
Constitution. This Law also amended certain provisions of the Petroleum 
Law. The key differences between the Petroleum Law and the Gas Law are 
described in Table 1 below.  
Under the Gas Law, the transport, import, or storage of NG may be 
performed by corporations or consortia at their own risk. Their formation is 
governed by Brazilian business laws, and their headquarters and 
administration must be in Brazil. The corporation/consortia must submit to 
the following transport regimes: 
a) a concession, preceded by a bidding process, shall be applied to 
all transport gas pipelines considered as being of general 
interest; or  
b) authorization shall be applied to the transport gas pipelines that 
involve international agreements.  
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The Ministry of Mines and Energy establishes guidelines for the use of 
pipeline capacity and studies its expansion. Under the guidelines, the 
Ministry may propose how gas is transported through pipelines, be built, or 
expanded. In addition, they define the concession or authorization terms of 
contracts. NG transport concessions have a term of thirty years from the 
date of the agreement’s signature but may be extended for an equal term 
under conditions set forth in the concession agreement. ANP administers 
the bidding process for concessions. Third-party access to pipelines is 
ensured by Article 33 of the Gas Law, which prescribes access through 
three types of transport services: interruptible, firm, and extraordinary. In 
addition, it applies to available capacity and, after its full hiring, to idle 
capacity for interruptible services (Pinto, 2014).  
The NG transport sector is considered a natural monopoly as well as an 
essential facility. Therefore, ANP is responsible for establishing the rules 
that guarantee third parties open access to transport installations, and for 
solving possible conflicts, as determined by art. 58 of Petroleum Law. 
Under the 2009 Gas Law, ANP has a duty to authorize the 
commercialization of NG, to promote bidding rounds, and to establish and 
execute concession contracts for pipelines; to regulate and approve NG 
transportation rates, and to inspect NG pipelines, and to monitor pipeline 
transport contracting practices. The Agency also regulates and inspects the 
warehousing of NG, oversees the transportation of the product in the 
network, and coordinates transport in certain contingency situations. (Gas 
Law, 2009).   
A Directive issued in 2016 (ANP 11/2016) establishes rules for several 
aspects of natural-gas transport among them: service providers in NG 
transport, operational swap of NG, and the hiring process for capacities of 
transportation NG. A party having a firm transport right may assign 
(transfer) all or a portion of its capacity. To preserve the Carrier’s rights, 
ANP regulates the capacity assignment (Gas Law, 2009). Further, ANP 
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Table 1: Petroleum Law versus Gas Law. 
 
Rules 
Law 9.478 (1997) 
(Petroleum Law) 




Negotiated between the 
parties 
Open season procedures 
for firm transport service 
Transportation 
Negotiated between the 
parties 
Set (concession) or 
approved (authorization) 
by ANP 
Tariffs --------- --------- 
Storage --------- 
Concession or 
authorization by ANP 
Import Authorized by ANP Authorized by MME 
Gas trading No regulation Authorized by ANP 
Shortage --------- 




Authorized by ANP 
No contracts signed 
between transporter and 
ANP 
No expiration date for 
authorization 
 
Concession by ANP 
Concession contracts 
signed with ANP last for 
30 years 
Authorization by ANP 
cases 
Gas quality Standards set by ANP Standards set by ANP 
Transport 
contracts 
Sent to ANP after signed Previous approval by ANP 
New pipelines Proposed by players Proposed by MME 
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Decree 7.382/2010 regulates Chapters I through VI and VIII of Gas Law 
11.909/09. It provides that the Ministry of Mines and Energy shall:  
I. propose, on its own initiative or driven by third parties, the transport 
gas pipelines that shall be built or expanded;  
II. establish the guidelines for the transport capacity hiring process;  
III. define the authorization regime applicable to each case to the NG 
transport activity (Article 6).  
For objectives driven by third parties, or based on its own initiatives, the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy must prepare a Ten-Year Plan for Expansion 
of the Gas Pipeline Transport Network (PEMAT), preferably revised on an 
annual basis based on studies by the Energy Research Company – EPE 
(Croso, Santos, 2014; Croso, 2015). When PEMAT was published in 2014 
(EPE, 2014), the only new eligible gas pipeline project was the 
Guapimirim-Itaboraí (Rio de Janeiro) project. This pipeline will be 7 miles 
long and will transport 17.4 cubic meters/day from Guapimirim, one of the 
arrival points of gas from the pre-salt fields, to Itaboraí to supply gas to a 
new gas petrochemical complex COMPERJ. (Iberglobal, 2014). However, 
Petrobras recently announced that COMPERJ construction is under review 
and that the pipeline bid round was suspended indefinitely.  
 3. New Institutional Economics: methodologic pathway  
This paper analyses the Brazilian NG Law and its main framework in 
light of parameters from Transaction Cost Economic (TCE) literature, 
which “tries to explain what institutions are, how they arise, what purposes 
they serve, how they change and how they may be reformed.” (Klein, 
1998). TCE is one branch of the New Institutional Economics Theory (NIE) 
and involves theoretical explanations about the governance of contractual 
and legal relationships, incomplete contracting, opportunism, and bounded 
rationality.   
The NIE seeks contributions from different disciplines—economics, law, 
scientific administration, sociology, and anthropology—to explain the 
nature and evolution of a wide variety of institutions. NIE is an important 
tool for better understanding the various interfaces between the economic 
system and the legal institutions that condition economic activities. For 
NIE, “firms, markets, and relational contracting are important economic 
institutions” (Williamson, 1979). Also, Williamson (1979) says that “the 
economic institutions of capitalism have the main purpose and effect of 
economizing on transaction costs.”   
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TCE focuses on the transaction as a basic unit of its analysis theory and 
explains the previous costs existing before the agreement’s conclusion, 
called ex-ante costs. These costs involve drafting, negotiating, and 
safeguarding an agreement under a legal framework, which are considered 
in a broad context.   
Contractual and legal problems might arise after an agreement’s 
conclusion due to the parties’ limited rationality and the impossibility to 
foresee all future troubles. These costs are called ex post costs
7
. Thus, it is 
necessary that the parties attempt to negotiate a process to govern their 
relations in order to avoid conflicts that could result in an anticipatory 
breach. One of the parties could be oportunist due to the contract being 
incomplete. Hence it is important to create contractual safeguards 
(Brousseau and Glachant, 2008) by creating mechanisms for coordinating 
and accomplishing the governance of the contract. 
According to Douglass North (1992), the needs of human beings 
constrain human interaction in order to structure the exchange in society 
due to incomplete information and limited mental capacity by which to 
process the information. Incomplete information and limited mental 
capacity determine the transaction costs which underlie the formation of 
institutions. Business firms, long term contracts, public bureaucracies, and 
other kinds of arrangements are called institutional arrangements (Klein, 
1998). The role of these arrangements are to reduce the costs and the 
uncertainty of human exchange. These costs and uncertain scenarios are 
significant because they influence human choice.   
 The rules and contracts, functioning as institutional arrangements, aim 
to reduce the uncertainties inherent in human relationships and the costs 
resulting from incomplete information and limited mental capacity. This 
economic explanation is used and interpreted by law science to determine 
the relevance of, and need for, creating clear contractual clauses that define 
contractual safeguards, bounding rights and obligations, restricting 
contractual terms, demarcating the objective of the contract and its 
definitions, foreseeing the paths of breach, and governing rescission and 
termination.   
For instance, following a brief exposition about the contractual 
evolution, Williamson (1979) clarified that contractual drafting will be 
                                                                                                             
 7. For Oliver E. Williamson (1979), “Ex post cost of contracting take several forms. 
These include (1) maladaptation costs incurred when transactions drift out of alignment (2) 
haggling costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments; (3) 
setup and running costs associated with the governance structures (often not courts) to which 
disputes are referred, and (4) the bonding costs of effecting secure commitments.” 
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driven, generally, by two paths: “a complex document is drafted in which 
numerous contingencies are recognized, and appropriate adaptations by the 
parties are stipulated and agreed to in advance. Or the document can be 
very incomplete, the gaps to be filled in by the parties as the contingencies 
arise”. The choice would depend on the parties’ goals, and it results in 
either flexible or rigid clauses. In general, one way to minimize the ex ante 
costs may be to use a form contract. 
The institutional environment based on rules is the primary factor for 
agents’ contractual choices. These choices are based on trade-offs between 
the costs and benefits of relying on alternative coordination mechanisms, 
either designed by agents (contracts) or provided by society (institutions) 
(Brousseau and Glachant, 2008).  
According to Williamson (1979), there are three critical dimensions 
which characterize transactions: (i) uncertainty; (ii) the frequency with 
which the transactions happens, and (iii) the degree to which durable 
transaction-specific investments are incurred. Williamson classified 
uncertainty as a critical attribute; “and that frequency matters is at least 
plausible”. These three dimensions apply to transactions of all kinds, 
including contracts, rules as well as laws. Based on this analysis, Ferraro 
and Hallack (2012) added that these three critical dimensions provide space 
for opportunistic behavior, raising investment risks. The authors also 
presented the application of co-ordination mechanisms and institutional 














Figure 1. Investment risks. Source: Ferraro and Hallack (2012). 
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According to the authors, co-ordination mechanisms are structures that 
foster co-operation and enhance mutual trust between agents. These 
mechanisms are essential to stimulating investment in industries with high 
transaction costs, e.g., the NG industry. At the same time, the objective of 
the State as a regulator is to induce cooperation when the coordination 
structure of the market is unable to do so, but without institutional stability, 
the government provides a new source of uncertainties (Ferraro and 
Hallack, 2012).  
Transaction-specific investments are investments where the value of this 
capital in other uses is, by definition, much smaller than the specialized use 
for which it has been intended. The supplier is effectively ‘locked into’ the 
transaction to a significant degree. This is symmetrical, however, in that, 
the buyer cannot turn to alternative sources of supply to obtain the item on 
favorable terms, since the cost of supply from unspecialized capital is 
presumably greater. Thus, the buyer is committed to the transaction as well.   
Frequency involves transactional periodicity and can be characterized as 
one-time, occasional, and recurrent. Recurrent transactions create 
credibility between the parties and reduce transaction costs as more and 
more contracts are successfully performed.  
Uncertainty relates to unforeseeable scenarios. Scholars have noted that 
“increasing the degree of uncertainty makes it more imperative that the 
parties devise a machinery to ‘work things out’ since contractual gaps will 
be larger and the occasions for sequential adaptations will increase in 
number and importance as the degree of uncertainty increases” (Williamson 
(1979).   
In the New Institutional Economics context, long-term contracts can 
promote a robust framework, safeguarding both downstream and upstream 
parties in the NG industry. The experience of take-or-pay contracts in the 
Brazil-Bolivia gas case has shown three different phases in the parties’ 
relations. During the final phase—the mature period of the contract—
conflicts between the parties may arise due to changes in risk-sharing and in 
the stronger bilateral self-enforcement mechanisms present during the 
initial and middle phases. Thus, an independent third party may become 
important to ensure compliance with the contract, thereby reducing risks 
and conflict. (Glachant; Hallack, 2009).  
It is not the goal of this paper to write about the difference between 
uncertainty and risk. Considering that risk is a form of uncertainty, some 
scholars attempt to measure the costs through market risk, legal risk, or 
political risk. In the petroleum industry, besides these types of risks, 
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Anderson (2014) cited commercial risk, completion risk, and operating risk. 
It is assumed that parties desire to minimize all of these risks.  
Political risk is a special concern regarding NG. Political risk includes 
the risk of arbitrary actions of any government having jurisdiction over the 
parties or the contract, and the resulting lack of confidence to maintain 
contractual and legal rules. As already stated, the institutional environment 
is the primary factor for agents’ contractual choices. Political risk is one of 
the most important factors that agents try to minimize when they decide to 
make a long-term, foreign investment. Thus, it is relevant to ponder 
whether the Brazilian NG legal framework minimizes political risk, 
especially in the LNG sector, which provides an important opportunity to 
expand Brazilian NG supply, demand, and use. 
4. Results and Discussions: A New Market Program 
On June 24, 2019, the Brazilian National Energy Policy Council (CNPE) 
released Resolution 16, which aims to establish guidelines and 
improvements to energy policies focused on promoting free competition in 
the NG market (New Gas Market Policy). Several guidelines were targeted 
in polemics—mainly those referring to the role of the dominant agent in the 
Brazilian gas market, Petrobras.  
CNPE’s resolution states that the agent occupying the dominant position 
in the NG sector should behave in a manner that will promote the total sale 
of the shares held by Petrobras, directly or indirectly, in companies engaged 
in NG transportation and distribution (CNPE, 2019). Petrobras, as a state-
owned enterprise, held 100% of the NG transport capacity in the system. 
CNPE recommended a transparent disclosure of Petrobras’s real and actual 
use of capacity, allowing other agents to access remaining capacity 
(RCGILex, 2019).    
The political process, which resulted in normative changes, was followed 
by complementary actions. Before CNPE’s decision, Petrobras sold the 
Associated Gas Transporter S.A. (TAG) to the Engie Group and a Canadian 
fund (CPQD)
8
. The deal was closed in April 2019 but not finalized until 
June 2019, due to claims that Petrobras had not observed the need for the 
endorsement of the Brazilian Congress. The sale of the controlling interest 
of subsidiaries of public companies and mixed capital companies without 
the need for legislative approval or a bidding process was analyzed by 
                                                                                                             
 8. In April 2017 the company had already sold it’s 90% share of interests of NTS 
(New Southeastern Carrier), for the price of approximately US$ 5.2 billion. 
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Brazilian Supreme Court, which decided by majority to allows the sale on 
June 6.  
Resolution 16 presents challenges that may need to be remedied by 
additional standards. For example, questions of how to harmonize the 
principle of respect for existing contracts and governance of state 
companies with the privatization recommendation and how to evaluate the 
opportunity and desirability of defining new concession contracts under 
federal entities competence need to be answered (Costa, 2019). In essence, 
there is a need for further dialogue between federated entities and the Union 
and for transitional rules (RCGILex, 2019).  
In addition, the federal government launched the Fiscal Balance 
Promotion Plan (PEF), which aims to establish a program of fiscal tracking 
and transparency for states. Two of eight measures listed by the federal 
government for states to adhere to in the new PEF, are the privatization of 
state-owned NG enterprises and the implementation of reforms and 
measures for the provision of piped gas services that reflect good regulatory 
practices (including open access to consumers) in accordance with ANP 
guidelines.   
Of course, those measures intend to create a harmonious environment 
between federal entities and the Union, as well as to decrease political risk. 
However, the agent distribution guidelines approved by the CNPE broaden 
the perception of risk for investing in the NG distribution sector, raising 
concerns about the lack of legal certainty. Yet, full compliance with current 
contracts limits the investment capacity of distributors (E&P Brasil, 2019).   
Moreover, PEF’s goal is to reduce the price of NG to the final consumer. 
The federal government believes that the divestment by Petrobras of its 
downstream NG assets will result in new competitive players that will 
improve the Brazilian gas market. Historically, Petrobras has sustained high 
gas prices; this is the main argument for the divestment of the NG assets 
that Petrobras controls. A parallel argument is made regarding the high 
prices maintained by state-owned NG enterprises.   
 Nevertheless, the recent privatization of the NG transportation sector 
will not realistically lead to a reduction in the price of energy until Brazil 
encourages more investment throughout the NG stream from exploration 
and production through transportation and processing (RCGILex, 2019). 
Indeed, according to Santos (2018), the risks that investors face in Brazil 
will discourage investment by international players. He argues that Brazil 
should focus on bringing Petrobras back into the NG business due to the 
lack of interested in the private sector to implement new NG investments. 
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This implies a countervailing national strategy to induce Petrobras to return 
to the NG business
9
.  
Although associated NG is plentiful in the Pre-Salt, domestically 
produced NG provides only 69% of total NG supply in Brazil (MME, 
2019). One reason for this statistic is that Brazilian Pre-Salt NG is 
expensive to bring onshore. Pre-salt associated NG reserves are a challenge 
to the Brazilian government and to players in the Brazilian NG market due 
to high concentration of CO2. The technological process involves 
separating the CO2 from the methane and then storing it or perhaps 
transforming it into an industrial input.    
Bolivia is the main source of imported NG to Brazil; however, its role is 
shrinking. Bolivian gas accounted for almost 32% of market share in 2015, 
but has declined to 22% of the country's total NG supply (MME, 2020). 
Gasbol currently serves distributors in five states (Mato Grosso do Sul, São 
Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul). The two countries 
have engaged in a take or pay agreement since February 1999. The Gasbol 
pipeline uses 24 of the total 30 MMm³/day capacity. Brazil’s obligation to 
take the total contracted quantity ended in December 2019. Accordingly, in 
January 2019, ANP released an updated schedule for a Public Call to 
contract for excess capacity in the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline. At that time, 
the Agency asked the transport company, TBG, to prepare a draft Public 
Call Notice that was subject to public consultation between March and 
April 2019. The corresponding public hearing took place on April 10 
(RCGILex, 2019). After the hearing, the Public Call was postponed to June, 
and then, in October, the Agency announced its temporary suspension. The 
Public Call was reestablished in December 2019. In March 2020, ANP 
published the authorization to hold the Public Call for capacity allocation, 
based on the transportation capacity waiver of Petrobras. In the new Public 
Call, the offer is the equivalent to 10,08 MM m3/day at the entrance spot, in 
Mutum, in the State of Mato Grosso (ANP, 2020)
10
.  
In addition, some of the winners of the last Brazilian energy auctions 
were thermo-power plants (TEPs) that are sourcing NG from LNG 
terminals, e.g., Porto do Sergipe I (Sergipe) and GNA I and II (Rio de 
                                                                                                             
 9. Energy Environment and Regulation Bulletin, n°1, 2018. The publication has been 
released and is currently being requested by the International Standard Serial Number 
(ISSN). 
 10. In parallel, an Incremental Public Call was launched, aimed at expanding the 
transport capacity of Gasbol. In an article of January 2020, E&P Brasil News Agency 
published that, according to ANP, TBG had 15 companies demanding entrance and exit 
capacities (38,7 MMm³/day and 29,5 MMm³/day, respectively) in this Public Call. 
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Janeiro). In Sergipe, the power plant will be supplied by Ocean LNG, a 
joint venture operated by Qatar Petroleum (70%) and N. Am. ExxonMobil 
(30%).   
Due to Brazil’s immense size and heterogeneous geography, supplying 
NG to isolated locations is especially challenging. Although Brazil has 
expanded its electricity services, costs of supplying electricity to isolated 
locations faces high delivery costs. Temporary emergency contracts have 
been a short term solution to supply fossil fuel at subsidized prices. 
Recently, the federal government promoted an auction to temporarily 
supply Roraima (an Amazonian State) until its transmission infrastructure is 
built. Eneva won a major share of this contract, which expects to convert its 
own NG production from the Azulão gas field into LNG for shipment. 
Thereafter, the LNG will be restructured to produce electricity. In some 
isolated locations, shipping LNG along the Amazon River system may be 
an alternative to transporting gas by pipeline, provided transaction costs can 
be lowered through a more efficient legal framework and a better 
institutional arrangement.   
In sum, PEF, Resolution 16, and Bill 6.407/2013 point to the same linear 
strategy: Petrobras’ divestment in the NG sector, the attraction of private 
investors, and third-party access to the NG infrastructure. This is the 
government’s attempt to leverage the domestic NG market, and therefore, 
reduce average costs of production in energy intensive sectors where NG is 
a main source of industrial input. However, an eventual failure of current 
open-access regulations may lead to a new monopolistic player—the gas 
processor. Resolution 16 does not prohibit the owner of NG molecules from 
dually owning a NG processing unit (RCGILex, 2019). Thus far, no open-
access rules apply to gas processing. 
 5. Conclusion and policy implications 
Brazil’s goal is to commercialize NG in a manner that will transform the 
owner (operator) of Brazil’s pipeline system from a NG merchant model to 
a transport-only model, endangering competition that allows consumers to 
buy NG from different NG traders.   
Article 48, a federal law, provides that NG commercialization 
agreements must contain a clause for the resolution of possible 
controversies, which may be arbitration, pursuant to Law No. 9307. Article 
49 states that the public enterprises, government- controlled corporations, 
their subsidiary corporations, affiliated companies, and holders of 
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concessions or authorizations are required to adhere to the instrument and 
arbitration agreement referred to in the previous article.   
Negreiros (2013) points out that the NG industry is at different 
developmental stages worldwide, and that the legal framework detail for the 
sector reflects the dynamics that characterize it. For example, if a country 
lacks effective legislation on the transport and trade of NG, then the NG 
cooperation to its energy matrix is not significant. This occurs when the 
degree of reliability by users and investors depends on the extent that the 
government’s policy and regulations support NG commercialization.   
While the opening of the NG market has the potential to increase the 
efficiency of services and to reduce the price of NG by increasing 
competition, the possible reduction in distribution company revenues may 
compromise the pace of investments in expanding distribution networks. 
Thus, reconciling goals, such as encouraging competition and distribution 
network expansion, requires the opening of the NG market, accompanied 
by the adoption of other regulatory mechanisms to ensure continuing and 
growing investment in and by distributor companies (Colomer, 2013). For 
instance, São Paulo is one of the most advanced states on regulation and 
organization of an open NG market, and it is also the most important one 
related to industry concentration, although, as shown in this paper, there are 
still important gaps to fill.   
Therefore, regulatory harmonization is necessary, including laws and 
regulations that will encourage the development of a robust NG market in 
Brazil. Barriers to entry into the NG market must be lowered to further 
reduce Petrobras' market power.   
The creation, editing, issuing, and application of standards at the State 
level must be consistent with national policy to promote NG use. State 
regulation must include incentives to expand the NG network—making 
pipeline NG services as universal as possible. LNG rail and truck transport 
should be incentivized where this cannot be accomplished. 
The regulatory agenda for NG in Brazil is currently under discussion 
through Gas to Growth and New Market Initiatives, which intend to build a 
new framework. This is attractive for investment, and the state of São Paulo 
will play a significant role in these discussions. 
In Brazil, there’s a perception that these opportunities may be missed 
unless we clearly define the process for constructing new gas pipelines and 
processing units. The country is initiating this process, and decision-makers 
should learn from past errors. There is an urgent need to create a frame that 
favors negotiations with stakeholders about the most optimal way forward.  
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